SAMPLEWe break the deepfake detectors your fraud defense relies on.
Margen is the independent red team for your deepfake defense. We attack the detection you have bought or built with the fraud that is actually circulating, then tell you where it holds, where it fails, and what to do about it.
Best fit for organizations holding large amounts of biometric data.
Detector report card
vendor-x v4.2
- Unseen generatorsFails
- Platform-realistic conditionsDegrades
- Per-group fairnessGap found
- Clean benchmarkPasses
Illustrative. Real engagements report the exact failure path.
At scale, no one is checking by hand. The system is.

RealHigh-volume identity flows, onboarding, verification, remote interviews, move far more traffic than any team can review by hand. And the best fakes now slip past trained reviewers anyway. The human layer cannot hold the line.
So your detection system is the fraud-prevention layer. These systems run several checks at once, and a weak spot at any one of them lets the fraud through.
That technical control is what we evaluate. We find where it fails, before an attacker does.
Why a strong-looking detector still lets fraud through.
01 / Recency
Trained on yesterday.
Detectors learn from the generators that existed when they were built. New models ship every month, and the detector has never seen them.
02 / Realism
Tested in a lab.
Vendor numbers come from clean, pristine images. Real fraud arrives compressed, resized, and re-encoded by the platforms it passes through.
03 / Fairness
Measured on the average.
A strong overall score can hide groups the detector barely catches. The average looks fine while a whole subgroup is an open lane.
The problem, measured
The detectors that scored perfect collapsed the hardest.
Detection score, where 1.00 is perfect and 0.50 is a coin flip.
Clean lab test
1.00score
Two open-source detectors that hit a perfect score on a clean test.
Real conditions
0.34score
The same two, re-tested against fresh attacks and the compression real platforms apply. Six other detectors slipped too, but far less.
Source: Margen open-source detector benchmark · 14 detectors
What we test
We test against attacks your detector has never seen.
Fraudsters do not use last year's models. We evaluate against generators held out of your training and add new ones as threats emerge, so the score reflects tomorrow's attack.
Three ways to red-team a detector.
All three draw on the same dataset and the same methodology. They differ in whether you run it yourself or we run the engagement, and who owns the customer relationship.
01
You submit a detector. We red-team it.
- Initiated by
- The detection vendor
- Duration
- 4 to 6 weeks, fixed scope
- Deliverable
- Report: verdict, per-group results, and the recipes that broke it
- Sensitive data
- Runs inside your perimeter on your own biometric reference data
- Used for
- Procurement, marketing-claim validation, pre-release QA
02
Your red team brings us in for the technical layer.
- Initiated by
- A red-team or security-awareness partner
- Duration
- Matches the host engagement
- Deliverable
- Joint report, human and technical layers
- Used for
- Enterprise security audits, joint engagements
03
You pull the data and run it yourself.
- Initiated by
- You, self-serve
- Duration
- On demand, ongoing
- Deliverable
- Labeled attack data via API, by cell, generator, condition
- Used for
- Internal QA, CI regression, pre-release testing
Purpose-built attack datasets, one per threat model.
Pull any of them through the same API, filtered by demographic cell, generator, and condition. Two live today, more on the roadmap, one schema across all of them so you can compare rigor before committing.
Five teams, one measurement layer.
“The third-party red team that helps you close the deal.”
Your buyers ask for proof that goes beyond your own benchmark. We are the independent red team that supplies it: an evaluation grounded in a corpus your team did not assemble and a method your team did not design, so the number holds up in the room where the deal is won.
What we measure for them
- Per-group performance. Demographic and platform breakdowns of every score.
- Bypass recipes. Every failure annotated with the recipe that surfaced it.
- Pre-release QA. A second pair of eyes before you ship.
Three commitments the measurement layer cannot exist without.
01 / Coverage
Coverage that tracks the threat.
Our evaluation corpus expands toward the frontier generators adversaries are adopting, so the benchmark keeps pace with the attack.
02 / Method
Reproducible methodology.
Every claim is backed by a dataset, a documented pipeline that recompresses media the way platforms do, and a pre-registered statistical methodology. Results can be independently re-run by anyone with corpus access on request.
03 / Fit
Context-fit evaluation.
We tailor the assessment to the threat the enterprise actually faces. The methodology is rigorous within each context, not generic across them.
Not an internal team. Not a generalist pentest.
A detector is a specialized control, and evaluating it takes a specialized, independent adversary. Here is how an engagement compares to the alternatives most teams reach for first.
| Capability | Margen | Internal red team | Generalist pentest |
|---|---|---|---|
| Independent of the vendor under test | |||
| Deepfake-specific attack corpus | |||
| Per-group fairness breakdown | |||
| Platform-realistic conditions | |||
| Pre-registered, reproducible method | |||
| Hands back the breaking recipe |
- 14
- detectors evaluated
- 12
- demographic groups covered per detector
- 1.00 to 0.34
- top detectors, from perfect to below a coin flip
- 0
- detectors we sell, by design
Near-perfect on paper, near-random under attack.
99% to a coin flip
Detectors that scored near-perfect on a clean benchmark dropped to barely better than a coin flip once we sent attacks they had not seen, re-compressed the way a real platform would. The pitch number was not the production number.
Read the researchFindingHidden blind spots
Strong overall scores concealed groups the same detector barely caught. For a buyer that is both an open fraud lane and a fairness liability, invisible until someone stratifies the results.
Read the researchFindingStale by the quarter
Detectors that lead today degrade as new generators ship. A validation from six months ago does not tell you whether you are covered against the attacks circulating now.
Read the researchFind your blind spot before someone else does.
Submit a model for evaluation, or add the detection layer to a red-team engagement. We return a per-group report card showing both kinds of mistake and the margin of error on each, and where a detector fails, the recipe that broke it. For buyers, we can point you to the detection that actually holds for your use case.
